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1. INTRODUCTION
In May and June of 1991, two advisory councils of the Ministry
of Finance ("MOF") announced the last of a series of reports bearing
upon the future shape of Japan's financial services industry. The re-
ports are a product of six years of study in the MOF and its advisory
councils. Although leaving some details undecided, the reports present
the outline of a system in which distinctions among ordinary banks,
long-term credit banks, and trust banks will diminish. The reports fur-
ther envision direct and indirect competition between securities firms
and banks. Indirect competition will occur through newly established
subsidiaries.
This article describes the political and economic forces that
prompted the MOF to initiate the reform debate, explores the process
by which this debate has been conducted and analyzes the areas of
agreement and disagreement apparent in the reports. Moreover, points
that remain unresolved are identified. The article then explains the
planned procedure and timetable for the implementation of the pro-
posed reforms and discusses the possibility that the MOF-initiated pro-
posals will be superseded by responses to a series of recent financial
scandals, some of which came to light only after the MOF advisory
councils had completed debate. The article concludes by assessing the
impact that the proposed reforms will have on financial institutions and
consumers, with a focus on the politics of financial regulation in Japan.
2. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND REASONS FOR THE REFORM
DEBATE
The current debate follows a series of gradual, piecemeal reforms
undertaken over the past decade or so. Before that liberalization, Ja-
pan's financial system could be characterized as highly compartmental-
* Associate, O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C.; J.D. 1988, University of
Chicago.
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ized, dominated by indirect finance, and subject to tight regulation of
pricing, products, and new entry. These characteristics remain today,
though in diminished form.
2.1. The Banking Industry
Statutory and administrative structures divide the banking indus-
try into long-term and short-term financial institutions. Furthermore,
trust banking activities are segregated. These divisions are explored
below.
First, three long-term credit banks may issue three and five-year
maturity bank debentures, accept long-term deposits, and generally
raise long-term funds for lending to industry. Ordinary banks, on the
other hand, are prohibited by the MOF from issuing such debentures
or accepting long-term deposits. The long-term credit banks have only
limited branch networks and view themselves as likely wholesale or in-
vestment banks in any future deregulated system.
Second, a single specialized foreign exchange bank, the Bank of
Tokyo, played a unique role in international transactions during Ja-
pan's fast growth era. The Bank of Tokyo was the sole Japanese bank
allowed to establish overseas branches in many locations, and it could
issue three-year maturity bank debentures. However, the MOF se-
verely restricted its domestic brarrch network.
Third, the trust banks have become specialized long-term financial
institutions, raising funds through the exclusive power to sell long-term
negotiable "loan trusts." Although a 1943 law authorizes all banks to
engage in trust activities, MOF administrative guidance since 1955 has
prevented ordinary banks from engaging in most trust activities.' Until
recently, trust banks and life insurers shared the exclusive power to
manage pension fund assets.
Fourth, the largest ordinary banks are referred to as city banks.
They have large branch networks and, since such banks were prevented
from taking long-term deposits or issuing bank debentures, they tradi-
tionally specialized in providing short-term finance to major corpora-
tions. Although not legally distinct from smaller ordinary banks (re-
ferred to as regional banks), the city banks lend to a somewhat
different market, serving as the "main banks" of large corporations.
Other small financial institutions and public institutions, such as
'See INTERIM REPORT BY THE SECOND FINANCIAL SYSTEM COMMITTEE OF
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON A NEW JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYS-
TEM 1 (May 26, 1989)(English translation by the Federation of Bankers' Associations
of Japan), original reprinted in KINYU ZAISEI JUo, June 5, 1989, at 64 [hereinafter
SECOND COMMITTEE'S REPORT].
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the behemoth postal savings system operated by the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications (with deposits approximately equal to the
combined deposits of the five largest city banks), play a less important
role in the following discussion.
2.2. Securities Activities
Although banks dominated the securities underwriting business in
the prewar era, Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law of
19482 ("SEL") created a division between banking and securities activ-
ities similar on its face to the division found in the United States'
Glass-Steagall Act.3 Securities firms hold the exclusive ability to under-
write securities of corporate issuers in public offerings and to purchase
or sell such securities on behalf of customers.4 The creation of new
securities firms is restricted by a license system, which is administered
by the MOF's Securities Bureau.
Despite Article 65's prohibition against bank underwriting of se-
curities, the cumbersome Japanese system for underwriting corporate
2 Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948 art. 65 (as
amended)(Japan), reprinted in Japanese Laws Relating to Securities and Exchange &
Foreign Securities Dealer, IV Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) MA 51 (1987)(English
translation)[hereinafter SELl.
* 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, para. 7, 78, 377-78 (1988).
' SEL art. 65, 1 prohibits any bank, trust company or other specified financial
institutions from engaging "in any of the acts enumerated in each item of Article 2
paragraph 8." SEL, supra note 2, art. 65, 1, at MA 51. SEL art. 2, 8 lists the
following "securities business" activities:
(1)To buy and sell securities;
(2)To act as an intermediary, broker or agent with respect to buying and
selling securities;
(3)To act as broker, agent or proxy with respect to entrustment of transac-
tions on a securities market (including a similar securities market located
in a foreign country...);
(4)To underwrite securities;
(5)To effect secondary distribution of securities;
(6)To handle offering or secondary distribution of securities.
SEL, supra note 2, art. 2, 8, at MA 4. The "securities" within the SEL's coverage
are: Government bonds, local government bonds, bonds issued by a juridical person in
accordance with a special law, secured and unsecured debentures, investment certifi-
cates issued by a juridical person established under a special law, share certificates or
certificates representing subscription rights to new stock, beneficiary certificates of se-
curities investment trust or loan trust, securities or certificates issued by foreign coun-
tries or foreign juridical persons, which are of the same nature as the foregoing, and
other securities or certificates prescribed by Cabinet Order. SEL, supra note 2, art. 2, I
1, at MA 2. Under Articles 10 and 11 of the Banking Law of 1981, banks are able to
buy and sell securities for the bank's own investment portfolio or upon the written
order of a customer, to lend securities, to underwrite and deal in Government bonds,
local government bonds, and debentures guaranteed by the Government. Banking Law,
Law No. 59 of 1981 arts. 10-11 (Japan), reprinted in Banking Law of Japan, VI Law
Bull. Series Japan (EHS) BA 5-6 (1986) (English translation).
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debt provides several roles for banks. In this area, Japan's regulatory
system permits banks to function as "commissioned companies" and as
trustees for the collateral, which, until recently, was required of all cor-
porate debt issuers.5 The amount, timing, and terms of issuance are
determined by the kisaikai (the "Bond Issue Committee"), which is an
industry self-regulatory group dominated by the long-term credit banks,
the largest of the city banks, and the "big four" securities firms that
lead manage most debt issues.6 The Bond Issue Committee has set
stringent financial requirements for issuers, thereby limiting direct ac-
cess to capital markets.7 The Commercial Code also limits the issuance
of unsecured straight corporate bonds to the smaller of a corporation's
net asset value or capital plus reserve fund.8 For secured or convertible
bonds, the above limitation is doubled.9 As a result of these and other
rules, bank-intermediated finance has long been dominant in Japan.10
Although no definitive legal interpretation of the applicability of
Article 65 to overseas activities of Japanese banks and their affiliates
exists, these activities have been limited since 1974 by the "Three Bu-
reaus Guidance." The Three Bureaus Guidance is a vague agreement
among the MOF's Banking, Securities and International Bureaus to
the effect that an overseas subsidiary of a Japanese bank should not
violate the spirit of the SEL and should not hold too much of any one
issue in its own investment portfolio." After further securities industry
5 Large corporations that satisfy stringent financial requirements may now issue
unsecured debentures in the domestic Japanese financial market. The first unsecured
convertible debentures were issued by Matsushita Electric in April of 1979. However,
requirements for issuing unsecured convertible or straight debentures were so restrictive
that only two companies qualified before the standards were relaxed in 1983. TDK
issued the first unsecured straight corporate debentures in early 1985. See JAPAN SEC.
RESEARCH INST., SECURITIES MARKET IN JAPAN 76 (1988). With the exception of a
few electric utilities, railroads, and NTT, those corporations that qualify to issue bonds
in Japan prefer the Euromarkets with their lower cost and greater flexibility. See N.
SASSA & H. MATSUZAKi, GIN-SHO SENso 93-100 (1987).
6 The "big four" securities firms are Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko, and Yamaichi Se-
curities. See New Penalty is Planned for Japan Brokerages, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1991, at D5, col. 1.
7 See N. SASSA & H. MATSUZAKI, supra note 5, at 72-96; see also F. ROSEN-
BLUTH, FINANCIAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 138-50 (1989) (discussing
the development of the Bond Issue Committee and restrictions on the bond market).
I Commercial Code, Law No. 48 of 1899 art. 297 (as amended)(Japan), re-
printed in Commercial Code & Audit Special Exceptions Law of Japan, II Law Bull.
Series Japan (EHS) JA 89-90 (1980)(English translation). See N. SASSA & H. MAT-
SUZAKI, supra note 5, at 130-31.
See JAPAN SEC. RESEARCH INST., supra note 5, at 67.
10 In 1974, indirect finance accounted for 84 percent of financial assets in the
personal sector in Japan and 48 percent in the United States. The banking sector ac-
counted for 74.1 percent in Japan and only 28.0 percent in the United States. Y.
SUZUKI, MONEY AND BANKING IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 18-19 (1980).
11 See N. SASSA & H. MATSUZAKI, supra note 5, at 207-15.
[Vol. 12:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/7
FINANCIAL SERVICES
complaints, the MOF issued another vague announcement, which, in
effect, permits banks to "underwrite Eurobonds for Japanese corpora-
tions, as long as they did not upstage the Japanese securities houses."1
Securities firms interpreted the MOF's guidance as prohibiting banks
from becoming lead managers. Even though foreign banks and securi-
ties firms now lead manage Eurobond issues for Japanese corporations,
the securities firms have managed to preserve the "Three Bureaus
Guidance" throughout the 1980s.'
Article 11 of the Antimonopoly Law prohibits banks, securities
firms and other financial institutions from holding more than five per-
cent of the shares of any company.1 4 Article 11 also gives the Fair
Trade Commission ("FTC") the power to grant exemptions from the
five percent limit. 5 The FTC has granted exemptions in cases that do
not present antitrust concerns, such as where a bank establishes a
wholly owned subsidiary to supply services to the bank 6 or where a
bank takes a temporary holding in a troubled company. 17 Within the
five percent limit, banks are major stockholders in companies with
which they have business relationships, especially in a bank's corporate
group (keiretsu). Banks also hold large portfolios of stock for invest-
ment purposes. At the end of fiscal year 1986, Japanese banks held
18.9% of all private sector shareholdings in Japanese corporations, as
compared to 2.1% held by Japanese securities firms.'
8
Each of the major banks has formed an informal affiliation with at
least one securities firm. Although some of these affiliated firms are
large, the big four securities firms have prevented them from breaking
into the role of lead manager. In 1988, when a securities affiliate of
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank attempted to lead manage an issue of the bank's
convertible bonds, the big four "blew it out of the water by assaulting
the market with new issues of their own."' 9 Moreover, the potential for
further affiliation appears limited, as the MOF has instituted severe
firewalls that restrict the ability of banks to lend personnel, supply cap-
12 F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 7, at 153.
13 See id. at 153-54 (describing failed efforts to abolish the "Three Bureaus
Guidance").
14 Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving
Fair Trade, Law No. 54 of 1947 art. 11, 1 (as amended)(Japan), reprinted in Law
Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly & Methods of Preserving Fair Trade of
Japan, II Law Bull. Series Japan (EHS) KA 15 (1987)(English translation) [hereinaf-
ter Antimonopoly Law].
16 Id. art. 11, ff 2, at KA 15-16.
16 For example, such a wholly owned subsidiary may serve as an employment
agency or property management company for the parent entity.
17 See Z. KITAGAWA, 5 DOING BusINEss IN JAPAN, Pt. 9, at § 4.04[2] (1991).
18Japanese Banks and Securities Business, 1(3) ZENGINKYO FIN. REV. 1 (1988).
19 ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1989, at 70.
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ital, and exchange information with affiliated securities firms.2°
As a general rule, Japanese securities firms are prohibited from
engaging in any business other than the securities intermediary busi-
nesses listed in Article 2, paragraph 8 of the SEL.21 Since a 1981 revi-
sion of the SEL, additional securities-related businesses may also be
approved by the MOF for securities firm participation.22 Individual
firms may apply to the MOF for permission to engage in these activi-
ties.2" As a result of this statutory framework, securities firms must
receive MOF approval before they can enter a new business area or
design a new product.
2.3. Reasons for the Reform Debate
2.3.1. "Objective" Factors
A combination of political, economic, technological and legal fac-
tors have driven the piecemeal reforms of the past decade and led to a
debate over more fundamental reform. A number of these factors are
stated in the advisory council reports. The first interim report to discuss
bank-securities firm competition reviews broad trends that favor finan-
cial liberalization.24 These trends include: the diversity of financial
needs that has accompanied the maturation of Japan's economy, a shift
in raising corporate capital from bank loans to securities, technological
innovations, new financial products, integration of world financial mar-
kets, and the "hollowing out" of the Japanese domestic market for
straight corporate bonds.25
The report notes two developments in bank regulation that favor
additional reform. First, interest rate liberalization has diminished
bank returns and increased the risk city banks face from a mismatch of
short-term deposits and longer term loans. 6 Second, capital adequacy
ratios, promulgated in 1988 under the auspices of the Bank for Inter-
20 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 14, 1990, at 1, 7. For example, for securities
firms capitalized at over * 3 billion, no more than five percent of that firm's executives
shall be persons on loan from the bank affiliate. For firms with capital in excess of
* 10 billion, the MOF has set a gradual goal of eliminating all exchanges of personnel
with bank affiliates, as well as limiting loans from the bank and securities trading tie-
ups. Id.
21 SEL, supra note 2, art. 2, 8, at MA 4; see supra notes 2-4 and accompanying
text.
22 Id.
21 See id. art. 43, at MA 40-41. As of the end of 1987, there were twelve such
approved securities-related businesses. Yoshikawa & Harada, Kokunai CP Shijo
Sosetsu ni Tsuite, KINYU ZAISE Jijo, Nov. 23, 1987, at 34, 37.
24 SECOND COMMITTEE's REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-8.
25 Id.
28 Id. at 9-10.
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national Settlements, have encouraged the securitization of assets to re-
move such assets from bank balance sheets.27 These factors undoubtedly
affect financial institutions. Further, these factors may have shaped the
MOF's stated goals for the reform project, which include: meeting the
needs of consumers, maintaining financial stability, and the "interna-
tionalization" of Japan's financial system. The aforementioned trends
and factors are best considered in light of the political landscape sur-
rounding the reform.
2.3.2. The Politics of Reform
The advisory council reports accurately recount these trends, but
understandably fail to consider the underlying political situation. The
recent history of financial regulation in Japan demonstrates that re-
forms seldom proceed without the widespread support of the regulated
entities. This support may come in the form of a bargain among the
regulated entities. Alternatively, the support may be the result of pres-
sure from a combination of sources, which may include foreign govern-
ments, the MOF, and institutions of the financial services industry.
MOF officials may have an independent regulatory agenda, but
the MOF's role has been accurately characterized as "acting preemp-
tively to equilibrate among groups in the financial sector, rewarding
them in proportion to their political resources." 2 As the regulator with
primary authority over all banks and securities firms, the MOF can
negotiate compromises among institutions under its broad regulatory
umbrella.
If the MOF fails to gain the agreement of a powerful industry
group, however, it risks an appeal by that group to the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party ("LDP"). On the other hand, the complaining group
will hesitate before resorting to the LDP. Such an appeal can be ex-
pensive, both in terms of political contributions and the danger of creat-
ing an adversarial relationship with the MOF. Moreover, the interest
group has no way of knowing in advance whether it can prevail against
the political resources of the MOF and any opposing interest group. If
the debate takes place in the Diet, rather than in the MOF, groups that
are underrepresented within the MOF (such as industrial companies,
trading companies, and consumers) may win additional concessions. As
a result of this political reality and the MOF bureaucrats' desire that
the MOF remain the principal forum for decisions concerning financial
regulation, successful initiatives tend to be compromises mediated by
:7 Id. at 10.
28 F. RosENBLuTH, supra note 7, at 226.
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the MOF. However, these compromises "speak[] not of MOF omnipo-
tence but of the MOF's sensitivity to political reality."2
The nature of MOF negotiated compromises among interest
groups is most evident in the battles between the Japanese banking and
securities industries. Many anomalies of Japanese financial services
regulation, such as the "Three Bureaus Guidance," the inability of se-
curities firms to engage in foreign exchange trading, and limitations
upon the ability of corporations to raise significant capital through
bond issuance, result from the failure of these two industries to compro-
mise. Most of the banking-securities reforms of the past decade have
been the result of successful compromises.
Under the existing framework, if a new product is proposed, a turf
battle erupts over the necessity of the product and which institutions
will participate in the new market. In many cases, the only politically
acceptable method of introduction is to allow both the banking and se-
curities institutions to handle the product. Alternatively, one industry
may "allow" the other industry to participate in the new market only if
the nonparticipating industry receives some power that it desires. If
both banks and securities firms will handle the product, the MOF must
agree not to seek a Cabinet Order designating the product as a security
under SEL Article 2, paragraph 1.o This is standard practice. Indeed,
the MOF has never sought such an order.
However, if the product is not designated as a security, investors
lack the legal protection of the SEL's disclosure requirements and rem-
edies against fraud or manipulative practices. For example, when com-
mercial paper was introduced in Japan in -1987, the MOF issued le-
gally nonbinding notifications (tsutatsu), which allowed both bank and
securities firm participation and established the market framework for
commercial paper. Investors, however, are denied the protection of the
SEL, and the MOF lacks the ability to directly enforce its require-
ments upon issuers, underwriters, and dealers. Instead, the MOF must
rely upon its discretionary powers over financial institutions to ensure
compliance.
Before focusing on the interests of the banking and securities in-
dustries with respect to financial system reform, several other conceiva-
ble sources of the impetus for reform should be considered. Despite
inconvenient service, poor returns on deposits, and fixed commissions
on securities trades, there has not been a consumer movement for re-
form in Japan. The absence of such a movement can be attributed to
29 Id. at 210.
30 See SEL, supra note 2, art. 2, 1, at MA 2.
[Vol. 12:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss4/7
FINANCIAL SERVICES
the diffuse nature of consumer interests and the lack of political entre-
preneurship by either the LDP or opposition parties. The only serious
"cconsumer" pressure comes from large industrial and trading compa-
nies. These groups have been instrumental in improving access to the
Euromarkets, introducing and subsequently liberalizing commercial pa-
per, and slightly improving the restrictions on bond issuance. Industrial
groups may support bank-securities firm competition, but there is no
evidence that such groups instigated the reform debate.
Likewise, although the United States has pressed for interest rate
deregulation and other liberalization measures in Japan, the United
States has struggled with its own battle over Glass-Steagall reform and
therefore deemed it inappropriate to advise the Japanese."1 Japanese
participants in the financial system reform debate have rejected any in-
tention to utilize foreign pressure in support of this reform.3 2 In the
absence of foreign pressure, LDP intervention, and demands by indus-
try, financial services providers must be the primary source of the re-
form movement. Those members of the financial services industry with
political resources must favor reform or, at the very least, hope to strike
a bargain that will benefit all sides. This explanation is borne out by
the facts.
a. Declining Benefits to Banks
Japanese banks have watched many of the benefits of the MOF's
regulatory scheme disappear over the past fifteen years. Bank domi-
nance of Japanese industry finance began to diminish in the 1970s, as
Japanese economic growth slowed and corporations reduced their de-
mand for bank loans. At the same time, large Japanese corporations
increasingly sought cheaper capital supplies in overseas markets. Not
only the Euromarkets, but new domestic products such as commercial
paper, now compete with bank loans.
On the other side of bank balance sheets, foreign exchange and
investment liberalization provided institutional investors with alterna-
tives to bank deposits. Meanwhile, securities firms introduced medium-
term government bond funds, which are marketed to individuals as a
substitute for bank savings. In response to foreign pressure and in an
effort to stem this leakage, the MOF began to deregulate interest rates,
starting with the rates paid on time deposits in large denominations (for
which there existed ready substitutes). This gradual interest rate liber-
31 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1991, at D8, col. 6; id., Nov. 6, 1991, at Al, col.
3.
32 See EKONOMISUTO, May 30, 1989, at 16 (interview with Ryuichiro Tachi).
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alization is now well underway, and the MOF has promised further
deregulation of interest rates by 1993.3 Deregulation has dramatically
increased the cost of bank funds, with a resulting deterioration in the
spread banks can charge borrowers.
Until the mid-1980s, Japanese banks emphasized growth in de-
posits and assets. As long as depositors had few alternatives and re-
ceived only nominal, regulated interest rates, a bank needed only to
gather more deposits to increase its profit. MOF regulation of branch
locations, hours of business, products and nearly all other aspects of
bank services limited attempts at non-price competition. The increased
cost of funds that accompanied interest rate deregulation and agreement
upon uniform international standards for capital adequacy (under the
auspices of the Bank for International Settlements)3 4 have caused Japa-
nese banks to eschew deposit growth. Japanese banks have shifted their
focus toward asset quality and fee income. The capital adequacy ratios
have made Japanese banks eager to introduce products whereby they
can securitize assets, for example pooling auto loan or credit card re-
ceivables in a trust and selling beneficiary certificates. Although there
have been some attempts to introduce such asset-backed securities in
Japan, they have, to a large extent, been delayed by legal and regula-
tory difficulties.
The stronger Japanese banks view the ability to engage in a broad
range of activities as their best hope to maintain profitability and com-
pete in international finance. The city banks expect to compete favora-
bly in any new business. Such business may involve retail products,
where their large branch networks provide an enormous competitive
advantage, and wholesale finance, where their strong corporate rela-
tionships provide an edge. The long-term credit banks envision a future
as wholesale investment banks with a central role in corporate finance.
The trust banks, on the other hand, are in a more defensive position,
having lost some protection for their regulatory niche of pension and
trust fund management. 5 Further, trust banks have far smaller branch
networks than the city banks.
Securities industry products, such as commercial paper and gov-
ernment bond funds, may compete with bank products, but the banks
33 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 10, 1991, at 1; MINISTRY OF FINANCE, RE-
PORT OF THE Kinyu Mondai Kenkyukai (May 21, 1991). The Kinyu Mondai Kenky-
ukai is an advisory council which, since 1981, has issued reports on interest rate
liberalization.
-1 COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATION & SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, PRO-
POSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPI-
TAL STANDARDS (1987), reprinted in 27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 530 (1988).
11 See A Survey of Japanese Finance, -cONOmiST, Dec. 10, 1988, at 13.
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do not expect securities firms to be strong competitors in most core
banking businesses. All but the largest securities firms lack the re-
sources to establish bank subsidiaries, and the main attraction of bank-
ing-access to low cost depositors' funds-has diminished. The trust
banks, on the other hand, fear securities firm inroads into their pension
fund management business. In sum, with the exception of the trust
banks, large banking institutions strongly endorse the relaxation of re-
strictions upon bank-securities firm competition.
b. The Rise of the Securities Industry
The securities industry reaped enormous profits during the 1980s,
as volume and prices increased throughout the decade. At the height of
the boom, Nomura Securities was the most profitable corporation in
Japan."8 The public and news media began to complain about the ex-
traordinary profits reaped by securities firms under the system of fixed
brokerage commissions. 7
The securities firms were concerned that the banks' strong rela-
tionships with corporate customers and large branch networks would
prove decisive in any head-to-head competition for underwriting or re-
tail brokerage business. Securities firms opposed any competition in re-
tail stock brokerage, which represented their most profitable business
and was the primary business of the smaller securities firms. On the
other hand, securities firms had far less to lose if banks were allowed to
compete at underwriting. Japanese banks already engaged in private
placements and served as commissioned companies for public place-
ments. In addition, the domestic market for corporate debt was severely
limited by its lack of flexibility, high cost, and stringent financial tests
for issuers. Securities industry representatives spoke of SEL Article 65's
banking-securities division with reverence and warned of the dangers of
universal banking and bank dominance over industry. 8
3. DEBATE IN THE MOF ADVISORY COUNCILS
The Banking and Securities Bureaus of the MOF mediate policy
disputes on behalf of the industry groups they regulate. Within this
scheme, the Banking Bureau communicates with and represents the
banking industry in debates. It was therefore not surprising that discus-
sions of Article 65 reform began within the standing advisory council of
" See Nomura No. 1 in Japan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1987, at D21, col. 3.
37 See, e.g., EKONOMISUTO, May 30, 1989, at 8-9.
38 Interview with officials from the Japan Securities Research Institute (June
1988).
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the MOF's Banking Bureau, the Financial System Research Council
("FSRC") (Kinyu Seido Chosakai). The advisory councils are the for-
mal mechanism by which interests outside of the bureaucracy may in-
fluence the MOF's policy-making process. The advisory councils also
serve to legitimize MOF decisions by making it appear as if such deci-
sions are made by a group of respected persons that is not directly affil-
iated with the MOF. These advisory councils consist of representatives
of regulated entities and other interest groups, as well as academics and
the mass media. The MOF selects the members of the advisory council.
It is somewhat misleading to state that debate takes place in an
advisory council, since the debate often occurs ahead of time in numer-
ous informal meetings among interested parties, bureaucrats, and advi-
sory council members. The process is very much under the direction of
MOF officials.
3.1. The Process
In September of 1985, the FSRC established the System Issues
Research Group (Seido Mondai Kenkyukai), which in December of
1987 concluded a report entitled "On the System of Specialized Finan-
cial Institutions" (Senmon Kinyu Kikan Seido ni Tsuite). The report
describes shortcomings of the current system and recommends the study
of various methods of financial system reform. 9 This report set the
stage for the debate over mutual competition among the specialized fi-
nancial institutions.
In response to the December 1987 report, the FSRC established
two other committees, the First Financial System Committee ("First
Committee")(Kinyu Seido Dai-ichi Iinkai) and the Second Financial
System Committee ("Second Committee")(Kinyu Seido Dai-ni Iinkai).
The First Committee studied regional and mutual banks and smaller
financial institutions.40 The Second Committee explored questions of
bank-securities industry competition and competition among the city
banks, long-term credit banks and trust banks. The Second Committee
completed interim reports on May 26, 1989 and July 13, 1990. A re-
constituted FSRC group, the System Issues Special Committee (Seido
'9 SYSTEM ISSUES RESEARCH GROUP, ON THE SYSTEM OF SPECIALIZED FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS (Dec. 1987).
40 The First Committee released a number of reports. See, e.g., FIRST FINANCIAL
SYSTEM COMMITTEE, ON THE SYSTEM OF MUTUAL BANKS (May 19, 1988). This
report recommended.that legal steps be taken to permit conversion of Japan's mutual
banks into ordinary banks. The Diet enacted legislation in accordance with this recom-
mendation, and 67 of the 68 mutual banks have since been converted to ordinary banks.
See REPORT OF THE SYSTEM ISSUES SPECIAL COMMITTEE, Seido Mondai Senmon
linkai Hokoku 42-44 (June 4, 1991).
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Mondai Senmon Iinkai), concluded the study and released its final re-
port on June 4, 1991.41
Meanwhile, in response to the FSRC initiative, debates of a simi-
lar nature proceeded in the Securities Bureau's advisory council, the
Securities Transaction Council ("STC") (Shoken Torihiki Shingikai),
and its Fundamental Issues Research Group ("FIRG") (Kihon
Mondai Kenkyukai). The FIRG released interim reports on May 27,
1989 and again in June of 1990. Along the way, separate subcommit-
tees addressed issues surrounding securitization products and reform of
the disclosure system. The FIRG's final report was completed on May
24, 1991.
The committees consisted of representatives of interested groups
and persons knowledgeable about the subject of inquiry (bank, securi-
ties firm, industrial company, and insurance company executives,
professors, commentators, journalists, representatives of the Bank of Ja-
pan, the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), and vari-.
ous others). Although the profusion of committees may seem confusing,
each involved a fairly familiar cast of characters, including a common
core membership. Ryuichiro Tachi, Professor (Emeritus) of the Tokyo
University Law Faculty, chaired the FSRC's Second Committee and
the System Issues Special Committee. Shoichi Royama, Professor of
Economics at Osaka University, chaired the STC's FIRG. Both Tachi
and Royama have written widely on questions of financial regulation
and are veterans of MOF advisory bodies. For example, Tachi chaired
and Royama served on the MOF's ad hoc Commercial Paper Discus-
sion Group, which in 1987 helped plan the introduction of commercial
paper in Japan.42 In this case, they sat as members of each other's
committees, where most of the debate took place. When the FIRG
formed two subcommittees for its 1989-90 debates, both Tachi and
Royama sat on the subcommittee that discussed bank-securities compe-
tition and reform of the securities markets.43 In addition, all of the
committees debating the reform included a core of common members
from such institutions as the Bank of Japan, Keidanren, Nomura Re-
search Institute, the Industrial Bank of Japan, Hitachi, the Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, and the Yomiuri Shimbun.
This common membership, the presence on all of the comriittees
41 REPORT OF THE SYSTEM ISSUES SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 40.
4' See Litt, Macey, Miller & Rubin, Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial
Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and
Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 369, 420-21 (1990) [hereinafter Politics].
43 Professor Hideki Kanda, a contributor to this volume, also served on this
subcommittee.
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of representatives of the banking and securities industries and profes-
sors from the major universities, and the fact that the deliberations and
presentations were guided by MOF bureaucrats, make it very mislead-
ing to think of these debates as separate discussions. Nevertheless, the
FSRC and the STC must represent the formal jurisdictions of the bu-
reaus that they advise. Sensitivity to questions of jurisdiction, as well as
the host bureau's influence over deliberations and its role in represent-
ing the interests of its regulated industry, gave a different focus and
flavor to the FSRC and STC reports.
3.2. The Interim Reports
The Second Committee began deliberation in February of 1988.
On May 26, 1989, this Committee presented its first interim report
entitled "On a New Japanese Financial System" (Atarashi Kinyu
Seido ni Tsuite)."4 The report acknowledges that Japan's compartmen-
talized financial system was designed to meet the needs of the immedi-
ate postwar period, when Japan suffered a shortage of capital for in-
dustrial development. 45 In typical understated fashion, the report
suggests that in an era of developed capital markets and excess liquidity
"the strict horizontal division of financial institutions' activities no
longer carries its full former significance."
46
The report accurately characterizes past deregulatory measures as
"allowing institutions to engage in the periphery of each other's busi-
ness."47 The first interim report concludes that the "basic framework"
of the present system results in "serious limits to the ability of business
liberalization to keep pace with the needs of users and the trends of
world financing. "48
3.2.1. Five Possible Formulas
The essence of the report is found in the remaining chapters. The
MOF presented the Second Committee with five alternative formulas
for reform, and these proposals formed the basis for discussion in the
Committee's meetings. The report briefly states the perceived merits
and drawbacks of each alternative and tentatively concludes that two of
the formulas warrant further study. The five proposals and the report's
preliminary assessments are summarized below.
44 SECOND COMMITTEE'S REPORT, supra note 1.
45 Id. at 3.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 15.
48 Id.
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a. The Piecemeal Approach
Reform could proceed as it had in the past, with gradually in-
creasing competition in the gray zones between ordinary, long-term
credit and trust banks, and between the banking and securities indus-
tries. This approach avoids major blunders and "provokes the least
anxiety in users and those concerned."'4 ' However, most of the periph-
eral products amenable to this approach have already been dealt with,
and "the remaining problems are largely insoluble by the piecemeal
approach. '50 Further, this approach requires "huge expenditures of
time and effort to effect mutually satisfactory adjustments."51 Piecemeal
reform lacks transparency and is difficult for foreigners to under-
stand. 52 Reform, in this instance, becomes a bargaining process among
financial institutions, while the original goal of better consumer services
is lost in the process. Finally, piecemeal reform leads to distortions in
the competitive environment, as institutions face different and some-
what arbitrary restrictions.
53
b. Universal Banking
Under a universal banking system, all types of banking and securi-
ties activities can be conducted within a single institution. Germany,
France, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom,
Hong Kong and Singapore, among others, use this system. For Japan,
however, "the leap to universal banking in one bound may be too dras-
tic," 54 and would result in serious dislocations.
55
Universal banks are efficient to operate and convenient for custom-
ers, since such customers can receive a range of services tailored to their
needs from a single provider.56 New entries into the banking and secur-
ities businesses would promote competition. Universal banking also
permits institutions to diversify and thereby limit risk. Banks already
handle government bonds, private placements, and new securitization
products without apparent difficulty.
Universal banking, however, suffers from several disadvantages.
First, banks might increase their stock and bond holdings, which may
' Id. at 37.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
" Id. at 38.
55 Id.
86 Id.
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raise concerns that stock price fluctuations would jeopardize deposits. 57
Second, universal banking raises concerns about the acquisition and un-
fair use of inside information.5 8 Japanese banks already exercise strong
control over their corporate customers through immense stock holdings,
through the dispatch of personnel, and by close ties under the "main
bank" system. Third, universal banks might eventually dominate their
customers .5  Fourth, economies of scale and scope, which would be
available to universal banks, might enable large institutions to eliminate
smaller competitors and institute an oligopoly.60 Fifth, banks might not
promote securities activities, as lending would remain their primary
business."' Sixth, securities firms would be at a serious disadvantage
during the transition period because of banks' access to central bank
funds and insured deposits. 62 Last, universal banking would accentuate
concerns about conflicts of interest, as financial institutions assumed a
variety of roles.63
c. Holding Companies
The holding company approach respects existing divisions and al-
lows new entry through the formation of holding companies and sub-
sidiaries, which operate in new areas.64 This system allows a group of
companies to provide a wide range of services. While this formula is
feasible in the United States, Article 9 of Japan's Antimonopoly Law
prohibits the establishment of holding companies in Japan.65 The hold-
ing company alternative could not proceed without an amendment to
the Antimonopoly Law. Japan is the only country that outlaws holding
companies. This prohibition is a vestige of its prewar experience with
huge industrial zaibatsu, each of which was held together by a central
holding company. Article 9's prohibition applies not only to finance,
but to all of industry, and "it does not, therefore, seem appropriate to
propose amending the Antimonopoly Law to reform the financial
system." 66
57 Id. at 39.
58 Id. at 40.
69 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 40-42.
" Id. at 42.
15 Antimonopoly Law, supra note 14, art. 9, at KA 10; see SECOND COMMIT-
TEE'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 42.
" SECOND COMMrrTEE'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
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d. Multifunctional Subsidiaries
Under this approach, financial institutions could establish a single
subsidiary, which would be able to enter into a wide range of new
activities.6 7 Operations of the subsidiaries would be restricted, for ex-
ample, to the wholesale market or to activities other than deposit tak-
ing. Large industrial firms and institutional investors would gain much
of the efficiency of universal banking, while small depositors and con-
sumers would continue to receive the protections of the current system,
since new activities would be segregated in a different legal entity. 8
The multifunctional subsidiaries system reflects the increasingly
blurred distinctions among banking, securities, and trust products for
wholesale consumers of financial services. The method of operation
would be familiar to firms that already participate in the Euromarkets,
where business is conducted in a similar manner. This approach would
enable the creation of competitive, flexible, and low-cost providers of
financial services, while preserving confidence in the conservative na-
ture of banks' activities.69
The distinction between wholesale and retail finance could be
drawn in terms of (a) the identity of the party to the transaction, (b)
the amount of the transaction, or (c) the number of offices. 7' The diffi-
culty of establishing a clear line between wholesale and retail finance
presents one problem with the multifunctional subsidiary approach.
Further, some of the potential disadvantages of universal banking
might arise, such as possible bank domination of industry and trouble-
some conflicts of interest. 1 The introduction of a new type of financial
institution would complicate financial regulation, and this formula pro-
vides little direct benefit to small consumers of financial services.72
The parent institution's ownership of shares in the multifunctional
subsidiary would contravene Article 11 of the Antimonopoly Law. 3
Accordingly, this approach would require an amendment to the An-
timonopoly Law or the receipt of an exemption from the FTC. Addi-
tional special legislation would be required, since the new entities
would not be able to conduct both securities and banking operations
within a single entity under the current banking and securities laws.
67 Id.
I8 Id. at 44.
69 Id. at 46.
70 Id. at 45.
71 Id. at 46.
72 Id.
U Antimonopoly Law, supra note 14, art. 11, % 1, at KA 15. See supra notes 14-
17 and accompanying text.
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e. Separated Subsidiaries
Under this alternative, existing financial institutions would enter
new areas of business through wholly owned subsidiaries. 4 For exam-
ple, a bank could establish a securities firm subsidiary and vice versa.
This formula bears some resemblance to the approach recently taken by
Canada." Except as restricted by the MOF or other regulators, each
type of new subsidiary would be permitted to engage in those activities
that existing institutions of the same type are permitted to engage in.
7 6
This approach would provide strong continuity with the present sys-
tem. The ability to compete through subsidiaries would diminish resis-
tance to the introduction of new products, because at least one entity
within any financial institution group could handle any new product.
The new entities would stimulate competition. Separation of operations
in different legal entities would simplify regulatory supervision in the
protection of depositors' funds and would avoid abuse of inside infor-
mation and conflicts of interest.
On the other hand, as new subsidiaries are established, the system
would duplicate some administrative functions and increase overhead
costs. Further, this framework lacks the flexibility of the multifunc-
tional subsidiary and universal banking approaches.
77
f. Elimination of Three Approaches
In a brief conclusion, the Second Committee's report rejects the
piecemeal, universal banking and holding company approaches. 78 The
report recommends that further deliberation focus upon either sepa-
rated or multifunctional subsidiaries.7 9 The Second Committee suggests
that further analysis should consider how to benefit consumers by re-
laxing the regulations that are placed on parent institutions.8" The re-
port concludes with the hope that the STC will study the matter
further.8 "
711 SECOND COMMITTEE'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-34, 47.
17 See id. at 22-23, 34.
76 Id. at 33-34.
77 Id. at 48.
78 Id. at 49.
'79 Id. at 49-50.
SO Id. at 50.
8' Id.; see Committee on Asian Affairs, The Restructuring of the Japanese Finan-
cial Services Industry, 45(2) REc. A. B. CITY N.Y. 194 (1990)(discussing the reform
debate up to this point).
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3.2.2. A Revised SEL
Meanwhile, on May 18, 1989, the STC's subcommittee, -the
FIRG, issued an interim report entitled "The Securitization of Fi-
nance" (Kinyu no Shokenka)."2 The report passed over questions of
bank-securities competition and instead focused upon the appropriate
regulation of markets in new securitization products. The report pro-
claimed the need to revise the securities regulation framework so that
new products functioning as securities would be included within SEL
antifraud and disclosure requirements. This goal could be accomplished
through either an expanded SEL or a financial services law applicable
to new products. At the same time, the FIRG recognized that if cover-
age of the SEL was to be expanded, disclosure requirements would
have to be adjusted to accommodate nontraditional products, such as
commercial paper and asset finance securities. Although the FIRG did
not address the question of new entry into the securities business in this
report, MOF officials and FIRG members insisted that the Securities
Bureau and the FIRG were not purposefully evading this issue. It was
made clear that the challenge of the Second Committee's report would
be addressed.8
3.2.3. The STC Agrees to a Formula
In 1990, the focus of debate shifted to the STC's committee,
which, as predicted, took up the question of bank-securities competi-
tion.84 To the surprise of some commentators, the FIRG did not reject
the concept of new entry.8" Rather, it accepted the separated subsidiary
formula as the basis for bank entry into the securities business and
proposed a number of conditions that would satisfy the securities indus-
try's concerns. These conditions were: (1) the scope of the subsidiaries'
business would initially be limited, then gradually expanded, and "for
the present," bank subsidiaries would be prohibited by law from engag-
ing in retail stock brokerage; (2) the subsidiaries' relations with their
parent institutions would be subject to strict regulatory "firewalls" in
order to ensure the safety of depositors' funds and prevent conflicts of
interest; (3) securities firms would be permitted to engage in foreign
exchange sales and trading, a business long denied them by the MOF
82 KIHON MONDAi KENKYUKAI, KINYU NO SNOKENKA (May 18, 1989), re-
printed in KINYU ZAIsEI Juo, June 5, 1989.
88 See KINYU ZAISEI JIJo, June 5, 1989, at 22, 25 (interview with Mr. Matsuno,
advisor of the MOF's Securities Bureau); id., at 26-29 (interview with Shoichi
Royama).
Id., July 9, 1990, at 64-79 (FIRG's 1990 interim report).
85 See SannyuJoken ga Shoten ni, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 5, 1990, at 5.
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at the banking industry's urging; and (4) securities firms would be per-
mitted to establish ordinary and trust banking subsidiaries.86
The securities industry accepted the separated subsidiary formula
because, when combined with rigid firewalls between parent and sub-
sidiary, it provides the best hope of segregating the new securities oper-
ations from the competitive strengths of the parent banks. In contrast,
the multifunctional subsidiary approach would allow banks to take full
advantage of their strong corporate relationships. Even worse from the
perspective of the securities industry, multifunctional subsidiaries might
prove to be an effective structure in a transition to universal banking, if
the MOF was to reduce and eventually eliminate restrictions upon the
scope of the subsidiaries' business.
In addition to addressing new entry, the FIRG continued to em-
phasize SEL reforms. It elaborated upon the SEL revisions that would
accommodate securitization products.87 The committee proposed a new,
functional definition of "security," which would include both tradi-
tional securities and new products.88 The discussion of this definition
heavily relies upon comparisons with securities laws in the United
States and United Kingdom. It is suggested that the functional defini-
tion will be similar to the definition of an "investment contract"
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Securities
& Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co.89
The committee also proposed a new definition of a "public offer-
ing," 90 clearer and less subject to evasion than the existing law. As part
of the price for bank entry into the underwriting business, the commit-
tee proposed a revision of the limits on corporate bond issuance and
reform of the commissioned underwriting company and trustee system
for underwriting corporate debt. Both changes are long overdue steps
that could revitalize the Japanese bond market and increase the alter-
natives to bank finance.9"
Meanwhile, the FSRC's Second Committee acquiesced to the
FIRG's choice of separated subsidiaries, though not explicitly rejecting
the multifunctional subsidiaries alternative.92 It also accepted the con-
8 See id.
8 KINYU ZAISEI JIjo, July 9, 1990, at 65-69.
I d.
89 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946)(An "investment contract" is a "contract, transac-
tion or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.").
90 KINYU ZAISEI JIjo, July 9, 1990, at 71-72.
91 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 16, 1990, at 1; id., May 28, 1990, at 1. See
also KiNyu ZAISEI Jijo, July 9, 1990, at 50 (the 1990 interim reports of the FIRG
and Second Committee).
92 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 6, 1990, at 14.
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cept of limited firewalls between parent and subsidiary, although mem-
bers of the Second Committee strenuously argued that the details of the
restrictions should be determined through administrative guidance
rather than through inflexible statute or regulation.93
The FSRC's First Committee issued an interim report noting that
smaller financial institutions would find it difficult to establish separate
subsidiaries.9 4 The First Committee's report proposed that regional
banks should be allowed to choose between establishing trust subsidiar-
ies or engaging directly in a limited range of trust activities. 95 By the
Summer of 1990, the basic terms of the compromise had been accepted
by the relevant advisory councils.
4. THE FINAL REPORTS
The final year of advisory council activity consisted of attempts,
only partially successful, to agree on the details of the reform. The final
reports contain details of the STC's proposed securities regulation
framework and other matters not involving competition among industry
segments. The scope of bank-securities firm competition, however, re-
mains unclear and is disappointing when compared to earlier grand
statements about a new financial system.
In 1990, the Bank of Japan's tight monetary policies finally burst
the speculative bubble that had pushed Japan's real estate and stock
market prices into the stratosphere. Prices of stocks listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange fell forty percent below their 1989 peak, trading vol-
ume plummeted, and real estate companies and stock speculators en-
tered into bankruptcy in record numbers. Both banks and securities
firms suffered from this dramatic change in the financial environment.
The securities industry lurched from an era of record profits into one of
grave economic uncertainty. In particular, small and medium-sized se-
curities firms were reported to be in dire straits. Banks suffered from
troubled loans to "non-bank" lease or finance companies and real estate
developers, while the value of their stock portfolios plummeted. 8
'3 See id.
"' See id., May 26, 1990, at 1.
95 See id.
96 As a result of the dramatic decline in the stock market, Japanese corporations
are no longer able to issue convertible bonds in the Euromarkets at low interest rates,
and equity financing has become difficult. These factors, combined with negotiated re-
ductions in the fees paid to securities firms as underwriters and to banks as collateral
agents and "commissioned companies," have resulted in an increase in primary issu-
ances through the Japanese domestic bond market. This market, however, remains mi-
nuscule in comparison to its United States equivalent. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nov.
1, 1991, at 7; id., Oct. 26, 1991, at 1; id., Oct. 22, 1991, at 7.
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Members of the advisory councils blamed these economic circum-
stances for the conservative nature of the final reports.' Given the
MOF's role as protector of the entities it regulates, the weakened con-
dition of the securities industry made the MOF responsive to securities
industry, arguments in favor of caution. The industry's most influential
proponents within the MOF, three former MOF Administrative Vice
Ministers who have gone on to serve as Chairmien of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, lobbied on behalf of the ailing industry and managed to "tip
the balance slightly in favor of less change.' '98
4.1. The Final Report of the FSRC's Committee
The System Issues Special Committee report was completed on
June 4, 1991 and was adopted by the FSRC on June 25, 1991.1, The
report sets forth a general principle of competition among the different
types of financial institutions to the extent that it is consistent with the
protection of depositors, the maintenance of financial order, and the
avoidance of harmful conflicts of interest or financial institution domi-
nation of industry.100 However, in contrast to the interim reports of the
FSRC's committees, the final report contains repeated references to the
importance of preserving "fair competitive conditions," a euphemism
for the protection of weaker institutions and existing niches.
The report recommends a system of separated subsidiaries as su-
perior to the multifunctional subsidiaries approach."'0 The separated
subsidiaries alternative, the report claims, allows broad participation in
new areas of business, maintains financial stability, protects depositors,
and avoids conflicts of interest."0 " On the other hand, according to the
report, the multifunctional subsidiary formula is an appropriate subject
for "further study" because it permits synergies among businesses and
added convenience for customers.10 '
See KNvu Z sEi Jijo, June 17, 1991, at 18-19, 23 (interview with Shoichi
Royama); id., at 44 (interview with Shinichiro Ohta, Senior Managing Director of
Mitsubishi Trading Co., Ltd.).
" Sterngold, A Japanese-Style "Old Boy" Network, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1991, at
D1, D6.
"REPORT BY THE FINANcIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON A NEw JAA-
NEsE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (June 25, 1991) (English translation by the Federation of
Bankers' Associations of Japan), reprinted in Kxnv ZAisi Jijo, June 17, 1991, at
52 [hereinafter FSRC REPORT].
100 Id. at 11, 20.
101 Id. at 21.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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4.1.1. Competition Among Banking Institutions
The report acknowledges that conflicts of interest and increased
risk to depositors are not major concerns in lowering regulatory barri-
ers among ordinary banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks.10 4
Thus, the report states that new activities might be allowed within the
parent institution of such banks. Nevertheless, the report rejects this
approach because of the differences in branch networks and the need to
preserve fair competitive conditions.'0 5 Instead, such new competition
should occur through subsidiaries. 10 6 In an important exception, the re-
port suggests the study of additional legal reforms that would permit
long-term credit banks and the specialized foreign exchange bank to
convert into or merge with ordinary banks.107 These institutions, how-
ever, have not taken advantage of past MOF efforts to encourage merg-
ers or conversions.
Despite this tentative statement in favor of subsidiaries, the report
proposes measures that would diminish the distinctions among the dif-
ferent banking entities. First, ordinary banks would be permitted to
offer savings instruments with maturities in excess of three years (to
compete with trust and long-term credit banks).1 0 8 Second, terms and
maturities of bank debentures issued by long-term credit banks would
be diversified.' 09 Third, restrictions on trust products would be relaxed,
and trust products of less than one-year maturity would be permitted
(which would foster competition with ordinary banks)." 0 Meanwhile,
the report acquiesces to securities industry requests that the MOF al-
low improvements in their medium-term government bond funds (to
compete more directly with bank savings products)."' As a result of
this liberalization, the practical distinctions between long-term and
short-term banks will disappear making it likely that long-term credit
banks will convert into ordinary banks.
104 Id. at 20-21.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 21-22.
107 Id. at 22.
108 Id. at 25.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. Many of the measures that would liberalize bank products accompany the
MOF's program of gradual interest rate deregulation. According to the MOF's most
recent schedule, released in May of 1991, time deposits of less than Y 500,000 will
become linked to market interest rates in the Spring of 1992, and a year later the MOF
will eliminate any regulation of interest rates or product design for time deposits. See
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 10, 1991, at 1.
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4.1.2. Competition Through Subsidiaries
The report envisions ordinary bank, trust bank, and securities firm
subsidiaries.112 City banks, regional banks, and other small financial
institutions will be permitted to form trust bank and securities firm
subsidiaries. Long-term credit banks and the specialized foreign ex-
change bank may establish trust bank and securities firm subsidiaries.
Trust banks will be permitted to organize securities firm subsidiaries.
Securities firms may create ordinary bank or trust bank subsidiaries.
The report concludes that there is no need for specialized foreign ex-
change bank subsidiaries. 3 It tentatively rejects any need for long-
term credit bank subsidiaries, but the report holds this issue open for
further study." 4
4.1.3. Scope of New Subsidiaries' Business
The report sets forth the principle that the subsidiaries may par-
ticipate in all areas of business allowed to existing entities."" Despite
this principle, the business of subsidiaries will be severely restricted at
the outset in order to preserve fair competitive conditions.2 6 Somewhat
broader powers will be added to the subsidiaries over time. In fact, only
the new ordinary bank subsidiaries will be able to engage in the full
line of activities allowed existing entities. Trust banking subsidiaries
initially will not be permitted to engage in the loan trust, pension trust,
money trust or other unspecified businesses."' "For the time being,"
securities subsidiaries will not be able to engage in retail stock broker-
age or other unspecified businesses." 8 Instead, banks' securities subsidi-
aries will focus on a broad range of securities activities in the primary
market. 19
4.1.4. Timing of Entry
The report states that the timing of authorization to establish sub-
sidiaries should reflect differences in the number of branches of the
parent institution and the degree of the relationship between the busi-
ness of the parent and the subsidiary. 20 This statement is widely inter-
.12 FSRC REPORT, supra note 99, at 22, 23.
113 Id. at 22.
114 Id.
1"L Id. at 22-23.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 23.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
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preted to indicate that the strongest competitors, the city banks, will be
handicapped for at least one year. Long-term credit banks and trust
banks will be given the first opportunity to establish securities subsidi-
aries, and securities firms will be allowed to establish trust bank
subsidiaries.12
4.1.5. Activities Within the Parent Entity
Banks will directly handle private placement of corporate debt as
under the current regulatory framework. 22 Securitization products
such as commercial paper should, to the extent possible, be handled
within the parent entity.1 2 8 Many regional financial institutions cannot
afford the cost of operating through separate subsidiaries. Such institu-
tions should be permitted to undertake limited areas of new business
within the main entity, including land trusts and public benefit trusts,
to the extent consistent with financial stability. With some exceptions,
regional financial institutions may choose between this method and the
establishment of subsidiaries.
12 4
The report is noncommittal on the ability of securities firms to
engage in foreign exchange business. The report suggests that the mat-
ter be "separately examined" by the MOF and offers various factors
that should be considered in that examination."2 5
4.1.6. Related Reforms
The report suggests a number of other reforms. Many of these
reforms are included to indicate agreement with proposals of the STC's
committee, which are discussed below. Such reforms include the STC's
proposals to revitalize the bond market and to revise the securities laws
to permit the introduction of asset-backed securities on a large scale.1 26
On its own initiative, however, the FSRC report proposes that banks
should be granted the ability to issue domestic straight bonds (banks
are now limited to convertible bonds) in order to raise enough capital to
meet the stringent capital adequacy regulations.1 27 Finally, the report
suggests that banks should be permitted to introduce floating rate say-
121 See Sogo Sannyu wa Kogin, Nomura ga Dai-ichi-go?, Shukan Toyo Keizai,
June 15, 1991, at 30; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 5, 1991, at 1.
122 FSRC REPORT, supra note 99, at 23.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 24-25.
125 Id. at 23-24.
126 Id. at 25-26.
127 Id. at 26.
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ings accounts, and, at long last, the Three Bureaus Guidance128 should
be eliminated.1
29
4.1.7. Foreign Financial Institutions
The report does not consider in detail the possible effects the re-
forms may have on foreign financial institutions, although at least some
of the advisory councils heard presentations from representatives of for-
eign institutions.130 Instead, the report asserts that regulators will con-
tinue to apply the principle of equal national treatment to foreign fi-
nancial institutions' operations in Japan, while making some
adjustments to ensure effective participation by such institutions.'
4.1.8. Insurance Activities
The report notes that the Insurance Advisory Council, another
MOF advisory body, has suggested the possibility'of broad competition
between insurance companies and other finanefal institutions." 2 The
FSRC agrees in principle with the idea of allowing insurance compa-
nies to compete through separated subsidiaries. The report further
notes that the matter is now under study in the Insurance Advisory
Council.' A report of that body is expected by the end of 1991.
4.2. The Final Report of the STC's Committee
The FIRG's final report, released on May 24, 1991, considers
questions of both bank-securities competition and securities law re-
form.'3 Because portions of the report duplicate recommendations
made by the FSRC, only those areas not covered by the FSRC and
those areas in which the two reports differ are summarized below.
4.2.1. A New Definition of "Security"
The report recommends amending the SEL to adopt a functional
definition of "security." The report suggests the following definition: a
123 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
129 FSRC REPORT, supra note 99, at 25.
120 See KINYU ZAISEI JIjo, July 2, 1990, at 27 (listing representatives of IBM,
Citicorp, and Salomon Brothers among those who made presentations to a FIRG
subcommittee).
131 FSRC REPORT, supra note 99, at 28.
132 Id. at 28-29.
133 Id. at 29.
13 SHOKEN TORIII NI KUKARU KIHONTEKI SEIDO NO ARIKATA NI TsurrE
(May 24, 1991), reprinted in KINYU ZAISEI Jljo, June 17, 1991, at 68 [hereinafter
STC FINAL REPORT].
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security is any contract or scheme under which (1) funds to operate a
business or manage assets are contributed by an investor; (2) manage-
ment is conducted by someone other than the investor; (3) the investor
receives distributions from the profits or revenues of the business; and
(4) the investor's contract or right is capable of transfer.
13 5
The SEL's current list of products that are treated as securities
should be maintained. New products, such as commercial paper, certifi-
cates of deposit, and transferable trust beneficiary certificates (for ex-
ample, housing loan trust beneficiary certificates), should be added to
the SEL's "securities" list in order to clarify their status. Under this
system, partial or complete exemptions from SEL requirements should
be considered when another applicable regulatory framework provides
investors with protection that is substantially similar to the protection
provided by the SEL. 36
4.2.2. Protections Against Direct Sales Practices
Because institutions that originate securitized assets are likely to
sell the resulting products directly to investors, the report reasons that
the SEL should be amended to provide additional protection against
unfair or manipulative practices in the direct sale of securities. In addi-
tion, the report states that because the structures for securitizing assets
are complex, SEL disclosure provisions and trust law and securities
investment trust law provisions should apply.
13 7
4.2.3. Revised Definition of "Public Offering"
The SEL defines a public offering as the solicitation of many and
unspecific persons on uniform terms and conditions." 8 Current law
fails to distinguish among types of investors, and the requirement of
uniform terms and conditions makes it easy to avoid public offering
status and its accompanying requirements.
The STC Final Report notes these difficulties and offers the fol-
lowing revisions. First, the requirement of "many and unspecific per-
sons" should be clarified to state that disclosure is required if an offer-
ing involves the solicitation of fifty or more persons within a certain
period (for example, six months). Second, an offering made only to
qualified institutional investors should not be considered a public offer-
ing, even if fifty or more persons are solicited. Third, in order to pre-
135 Id. at 2-3.
131 Id. at 3-4.
137 Id. at 4-6.
18 SEL, supra note 2, art. 2, 1 3, at MA 3.
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vent circumvention of public offering disclosure requirements, restric-
tions should be placed on the resale of securities that are distributed
outside of a public offering. Fourth, the "uniform terms and condi-
tions" requirement should be abolished."8 9
This portion of the report also deals with the private placement of
securities. Private placements should be defined in the SEL to include
all securities distributions that are not within the definition of a public
offering. Privately placed securities should be subject to restrictions on
resale, at least for a limited period following issuance.
1 40
4.2.4. Revised Disclosure System
The report recommends several adjustments to the disclosure sys-
tem. Even when securities are not distributed in a public offering, the
SEL should grant regulators the discretion to demand limited disclosure
in appropriate cases. In addition to current legal requirements for
ongoing disclosure, the SEL should establish a continuing duty of dis-
closure for any class of security that is held by more than five hundred
persons.
1 41
Perhaps the most important recommendation is that current dis-
closure requirements should not be applied in toto to products that will
be included under the new functional definition of security. Securities
should be exempt from SEL disclosure requirements when other laws
require similar disclosure or provide equivalent investor protection, or
when no problem of investor protection is present. Disclosure content
and procedure may be simplified for-short-term securities with exemp-
tions granted as appropriate.
142
The report recommends that securitization products should be
handled under the current disclosure system, but some adjustment will
be necessary to account for the special characteristics of asset finance
securities. The structure of such securities, the legal rights of investors,
and details concerning the originator and the manager of the assets
must be disclosed in a comprehensible form. Further, continuing dis-
closure may be simplified or an exemption granted for these
products.14 s
1"9 STC FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 8-9.
140 Id. at 9-10.
141 Id. at 8-9.
142 Id. at 9.
143 Id.
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4.2.5. Revitalization of the Market for Public Placement of Corpo-
rate Debt
The report declares the need to revise or abolish numerous regula-
tions on the issuance of corporate debt securities. Revision of the corpo-
rate bond law is being studied by a subcommittee of the Ministry of
Justice's advisory council. The Commercial Code's limitations on bond
issuance""" must be eliminated, and the trustee system must be im-
proved by, among other things, clarifying the duties of the commis-
sioned underwriting company. The financial standards required for the
issuance of bonds should be relaxed, and the bond rating system must
be strengthened. Fees in the underwriting process should be reduced to
levels comparable to other countries' markets. Restrictions upon the de-
sign of products should be discarded, as soon as possible, so that prod-
ucts can develop in response to the needs of issuers and investors.
1, 45
4.2.6. Revision of Article 65 to Permit Banks to Handle Nontradi-
tional Securities and Private Placements
Since products handled by banks would be treated as securities
under the revised SEL, the report suggests the introduction of a limited
license system that would permit those entities not primarily engaged in
the securities business to handle such products when appropriate.
Under this limited license procedure, banks could continue to handle
commercial paper, certificates of deposit and other short-term securities.
At the same time, the report argues that restrictions upon non-securities
activities of securities firms should be relaxed.
1 4
1
Under the current SEL, private placement of securities is not con-
sidered a "securities intermediary business," and Article 65 of the SEL
does not prohibit private placement activities by banks.1 47 The report
proposes that the private placement of securities should be included
within the scope of the revised SEL. Nevertheless, it acknowledges that
private placement activities raise little risk of conflicts of interest or
other problems. Further, privately placed securities are similar in func-
tion to bank loans. Banks should therefore be allowed to engage in pri-
vate placements.
1 48
144 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
145 STC FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 11-12.
146 Id. at 13.
147 SEL, supra note 2, art. 2, 8, at MA 4; id. art. 65, at MA 51.
141 STO FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 13-14.
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4.2.7. Areas of Business Subject to New Entry
Instead of accepting the FSRC's suggestion that new entrants
should be able to engage in all businesses permitted to existing entities,
the STC report takes a far more conservative approach. It proposes
that new entry be allowed only when necessary for the development of
competitive markets that meet the needs of consumers. In the primary
market, the big four securities firms have an extremely high market
share, and issuers seldom shift business to a lead manager outside of
these four firms. In order to effectively promote competition, the re-
forms must allow new entry, simplify the issuance and underwriting
procedures, and enable a "strengthening [of] the competitive ability of
securities firms."
1 4 9
Secondary markets, on the other hand, have developed and diversi-
fied to meet the needs of consumers. The market share of the big four
firms in secondary market trading continues to decline. In comparison
to the primary market, the need for new entry in the secondary market
appears small.
1 50
4.2.8. Manner of New Entry
In order to safeguard the "independent management of securities
firms," avoid conflicts of interest, and ease concerns about bank safety,
the report suggests that new entry not take place directly, but through
separate entities. Even if new entry occurs through subsidiaries, the
market must be protected by ensuring *the independent management
and stability of securities firm subsidiaries, by protecting against con-
flicts of interest, and by preserving "fair competition."
New entry should be gradual so as not to upset market stability.
The following should be avoided: First, the risk of the parent affecting
the subsidiary; second, the subsidiary's business being excessively de-
pendent upon transactions with a particular person; third, the subsidi-
ary underwriting securities of the parent or underwriting securities of a
financially troubled company in order for that company to repay debts
owed to the parent; fourth, efforts by the parent to support the subsidi-
ary by offering extremely favorable terms to customers of the subsidi-
ary, or by exerting a direct power of influence on issuers or investors;
fifth, agreements that a parent will lend money on the condition that
the customer purchases securities from the subsidiary; sixth, transac-
tions between parent and subsidiary on terms extremely favorable to
149 Id. at 14.
150 Id. at 14-15.
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the subsidiary; seventh, purchases by the parent of securities underwrit-
ten by the subsidiary during a limited period following issuance; eighth,
disclosure of nonpublic customer information by a parent to a subsidi-
ary; and finally, the sharing of parent and subsidiary offices or inter-
locking boards of directors.1 5
Firewall measures, which take into account the subsidiary's busi-
ness, should be implemented between the parent and the subsidiary.
The details of regulatory firewalls should be flexible so as to permit
responses to a changing market environment. As necessary, similar
measures should be taken with regard to existing keiretsu securities af-
filiates of banks.
1 52
4.2.9. Special Problems of Bank Entry into the Securities Business
The fundamental concepts underlying SEL Article 65-avoiding
conflicts of interest, preventing bank domination of industry, and ensur-
ing the health of banks-remain important principles and should be
taken into account in formulating reform proposals.1 5 Because large
banks hold a special position and are able to exert influence over corpo-
rations, regulations are necessary in order to prevent an adverse impact
on the market.
154
The scope and tempo of bank entry into the securities business
should be guided by the relationship between securities and the bank's
principal business and the status of different financial industries in the
markets for each type of security. Adequate care should be taken to
ensure that market disturbances do not result from new entry.
In particular, bank subsidiaries should be prohibited by statute
from entering the retail stock brokerage business. Given the historical
lack of bank involvement in that business, the large scale shareholdings
of many banks, and the fact that retail brokerage is the main business
of smaller securities firms, special care is needed to prevent market dis-
turbances in this area.
1 55
The report concludes with its expectation that the FSRC will un-
dertake appropriate responses to the question of securities firm entry
into ordinary and trust banking and the foreign exchange business. The
report asserts that measures will be taken to avoid distortion of markets
151 Id. at 16.
152 Id. at 16-17.
155 SEL, supra note 2, art. 65, at MA 51.
1" For example, a securities subsidiary that underwrites the securities of a com-
pany which the parent bank has the power to influence may adversely impact the
market.
185 STC FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 17-18.
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when securities firms enter the ordinary and trust banking
businesses.15
4.3. Unresolved Questions
Disagreements over the timing of new entry and the scope of busi-
ness appear unavoidable. Few such disagreements were resolved over
the course of the final year of debate. The reports contain incomplete
lists of products that will be subject to specified treatment. For instance,
each list that ends with an "etc. . ." indicates the failure to reach
agreement on the list's contents. The reports also include matters upon
which failure to agree was resolved only by a recommendation that the
matter be left to the MOF's judgment. This apparent delegation to the
MOF does not, however, foreclose the possibility that the Banking and
Securities Bureaus will continue to press the viewpoints of their respec-
tive industries.
The STC report opposes the FSRC's proposal that new subsidiar-
ies should be able to engage in all businesses in which existing securi-
ties firms are permitted to engage. Rather, it contemplates a two-tier
system that would permit new entrants to engage in a particular busi-
ness only when necessary to ensure that a particular market is competi-
tive. Thus, the STC would place the burden of proof upon the new
entrant, while the FSRC would place such burden on the party re-
sisting competition. The final STC report softens earlier language that
would have limited activities of the banks' new subsidiaries to under-
writing. Instead, the STC report suggests that, with the exception of
the sacred stock brokerage, the scope of new entry will be left to the
MOF's judgment regarding the necessity of additional competition.
This solution papers over a debate on the ability of new securities sub-
sidiaries to enter secondary markets in corporate bonds, convertible
bonds, bonds with warrants, and other hybrid products. These areas
are likely subjects of future debate concerning the issue of gradual in-
creases in subsidiaries' powers.
The scope of activities of trust banking subsidiaries remains uncer-
tain, though the core of trust bank activities will be excluded in an
attempt to protect the trust banks. The FSRC report lists excluded bus-
iness areas as "some versions of money trust, such as loan trusts and
pension trusts."15 The ability of ordinary banks to issue bank deben-
tures in competition with the long-term credit banks also remains un-
certain (a matter "for further study"). The regional banks' scope of
158 Id. at 18-19.
157 FSRC REPORT, supra note 99, at 20.
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permissible activities, without a separate subsidiary, remains unclear.
The position of the insurance industry also remains uncertain in its
details. The language of the final FSRC report is noncommittal regard-
ing the ability of securities firms to engage in the foreign exchange
business.1 8"
The banks have yet to agree on the type of detailed firewalls that
will be demanded by the securities firms. The FSRG final report only
vaguely refers to firewalls, and the report recognizes firewalls as an
alternative only when other regulatory measures prove inadequate. The
STC, on the other hand, lists a number of situations it considers prob-
lematic. For example, the STC would attempt to prevent a new securi-
ties subsidiary from becoming the de facto lead manager of public of-
ferings by members of the parent bank's keiretsu. The banks have
requested that the details of firewalls be left to administrative guidance,
so that they can be easily modified periodically.
If the Securities Bureau requires anything like the firewalls now
administratively imposed upon bank relationships with keiretsu securi-
ties firms,1" the banks will gain little from the reforms. In this in-
stance, the banks, at the very least, will attempt to drive a harder bar-
gain elsewhere or will gain a commitment that firewalls will be relaxed
after an unprofitable initial period of securities subsidiary operations.
Foreign financial institutions will likely resist firewalls that would in-
crease the expense of their operations in Tokyo.
Despite the MOF's attempt to seal a grand bargain, the industries
will press their interests throughout the implementation stage of the
reform, as is apparent from the comments of industry participants that
accompanied the release of the final reports.160 On the other hand, the
promise of a gradual easing of restrictions means that all parties can
hold out hope of subsequent entry into areas that are initially foreclosed
to them. The banks can seek a rehearing if a reform proposal is ineffec-
tive, and the securities firms can delay further liberalization if the new
competition results in a serious deterioration of their business.
This approach comports with the established practice of gradual
financial liberalization in Japan. Gradual reform lessens dislocations to
established businesses, ensures the stability of the financial system, and
creates a steady stream of discretionary MOF decisions.1 61 Thus, grad-
188 See supra notes 86, 126 and accompanying text.
'5' See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
160 See KiNyu ZAISEI Jijo, June 17, 1991, at 40-45.
161 See Politics, supra note 42, at 427-28; for a discussion of a similar attempt to
diminish the political opposition to reform, see Ramseyer & Nakazato, Tax Transitions
and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV.
1155 (1989) (arguing that the use of grandfather clauses is an effective transitional
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ual reform facilitates agreement among the regulated entities, who
would otherwise utilize all of their political resources to veto a
change.' 62 Further, the steady stream of MOF decisions bolsters the
MOF's power in its relationship with the regulated industries. The
regulated entities must return regularly to the MOF with requests for
relief, which allows the MOF to monitor the progress of such entities
in the new activity.163
The STC hopes to shield retail stock brokerage from any future
gradually negotiated reform by placing the restriction on new entry in
the SEL. The FSRC has agreed that "for the time being" new securi-
ties subsidiaries of banks will not be able to engage in retail brokerage.
However, the FSRC did not recommend that the prohibition be written
into the statute. A disagreement on this question could slow drafting of
the statutory amendments, which is the first step toward implementa-
tion of the reforms.
Even if the interested parties accept the details of the reforms, the
FTC has yet to agree that financial institutions should be exempted
from Article 11 of the Antimonopoly Law. Such an exemption would
allow financial institutions to establish wholly owned subsidiaries that
compete in each other's businesses. If the FTC does not acquiesce, an
amendment to the Antimonopoly Law would be required, which would
result in further delay. In fact, however, Article 11 seems aimed at
preventing financial institution control of non-financial companies,
while Article 65 of the SEL is intended to achieve similar goals within
the financial sector. Because the statutory reforms will include an
amendment to Article 65 of the SEL, and should increase competition
in financial markets, it seems somewhat unlikely that the FTC would
object to either an exemption from Article 11 or an appropriate amend-
ment of the statute. Moreover, because Article 11 of the Antimonopoly
Law requires that the FTC consult with the MOF regarding exemp-
tions,' 64 it seems unlikely that the separated subsidiaries proposal
would have made it this far without MOF-FTC consultation and the
tacit acceptance of the FTC.
5. TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION
5.1. The Contemplated Schedule
The final reports request that the MOF resolve undecided matters
strategy that allows legislative bodies to pursue tax reform).
1"2 See Politics, supra note 42, at 428.
163 See id.
'" Antimonopoly Law, supra note 14, art. 11, 1 3, at KA 16.
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and draft legislation necessary to implement the proposed reforms. The
MOF's schedule contemplates drafting of legislation during the Fall of
1991, a process now underway, and enactment in the Spring of 1992.
This would be followed by the drafting of detailed rules and "notifica-
tions" to the regulated entities. The first subsidiaries would begin oper-
ating in 1993. There is, however, at least one reason to doubt whether
the MOF's program will remain on schedule.
5.2. The Banking and Securities Scandals of 1991
Under ordinary circumstances, the ruling LDP has tended to leave
financial policy questions to the MOF.1 5 Since the banking and securi-
ties industries are major sources of support for the LDP, the MOF's
negotiation of an agreement with representatives from these industries
will ensure passage of the legislation and implementation by the MOF,
without the interference of politicians. In May of 1991, the LDP's Fi-
nancial Policy Committee established a subcommittee to study the advi-
sory council reports and any resulting MOF legislative proposals. On
May 17, 1991, the Chairman of that group, LDP Diet member and
former MOF bureaucrat Tetsuo Kondo, released a statement accepting
the separated subsidiary approach as an appropriate, practical step to-
ward reform.
166
The MOF proposals, however, will not be debated under normal
circumstances. After approving the MOF proposals as a step toward
reform, Representative Kondo's statement goes on to criticize the lack
of consumer input into the process and to suggest universal banking as
a goal for later reforms.' 67 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported that
the LDP hopes to pass the MOF proposals."6 8 However, after such
enactment, the LDP seeks to complete a more fundamental reform
package, which would include government financial institutions, within
the next two years.' 9 The LDP's apparent eagerness to enter the re-
form debate can be best understood by examining the intense public
attention now focused on the regulation of financial institutions. This
widespread public concern resulted from a series of major scandals that
came to light in the Spring and Summer of 1991.
1'5 See Politics, supra note 42, at 408; see also F. ROSENBLtJrH, supra note 7, at
135-36, 212-15 (discussing the lack of political entrepreneurship-on financial issues).
"66 Statement of Tetsuo Kondo, Member of the House of Representatives and
Chairman of the LDP's Kinyu Mondai Chosakai (May 17, 1991)(copy on file with the
author)[hereinafter Statement of Tetsuo Kondo]; see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 6,
1991, at 7.
167 Statement of Tetsuo Kondo, supra note 166.
168 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 6, 1991, at 7.
169 Id., May 17, 1991, at 1.
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The securities industry scandals include revelations that the major
securities firms paid at least * 172 billion in "loss compensation" to
favored clients to offset losses suffered in the 1990 stock market decline,
while leaving the small investor unprotected. 70 Also, it was recently
revealed that Nomura and Nikko Securities lent huge sums of money to
Susumu Ishii, the former boss of one of Japan's largest organized crime
groups, to finance the purchase of shares of Tokyu Railroad
Corporation.
1 71
The admitted loss compensation payments may prove to be only
the tip of the iceberg. Securities firms may have offered informal guar-
anteed returns on trillions of yen invested in one type of tax avoidance
trust fund (eigyo tokkin), 7 2 The loss compensation schemes may not be
illegal under existing law, so long as investment returns are not guar-
anteed in advance. When the question first came to the MOF's atten-
tion in 1989, following the October 1989 decline in Tokyo stocks, the
MOF issued a notification directing that the securities firms not engage
in such schemes. Apparently, the MOF failed to detect the massive
payments and was unable to enforce its own administrative guidance.
Only after intense pressure from the press and public did the MOF
begin a serious investigation into the allegations that Nomura and
Nikko Securities engaged in illegal manipulation of Tokyu Railroad
Corporation shares. The MOF has also hurriedly presented the Diet
with legislation that would prohibit loss compensation payments re-
gardless of whether they were promised in advance as a guaranteed
return.
Meanwhile, banks have been implicated in several multi-billion
dollar schemes to avoid administrative restrictions on real estate and
construction lending. Recently announced frauds involve the issuance of
false certificates of deposit-in two cases, in excess of $1 billion face
value-to speculators who would present the certificates as collateral
for additional loans to support their activities.17 ' These incidents have
added to an environment in which the media has begun to question the
MOF's will and ability to supervise the industry that it promotes and
protects. The MOF has been severely criticized for failing to prevent
seemingly endless wrongdoing.
17 4
In July of 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu suggested that considera-
"70 See ECONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at 73-74.
171 See id.
171 See Trapped in the Rubble, ECONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at 65.
171 See id., Sept. 7, 1991, at 75-76; id., Aug. 10, 1991, at 70-71.
174 See, e.g., Sanger, Four Firms Penalized by Japan, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1991,
at D1, col. 6 (criticizing the MOF's failure to prevent the financial scandals and its
reluctance to investigate the scandals).
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tion be given to the idea of an independent securities regulation en-
forcement agency or "Japanese SEC." The Prime Minister's adminis-
trative reform advisory council has indicated its support for a new
regulatory body, though probably as a "separate bureau" under the
Finance Minister.175 The National Tax Administration Agency is such
a separate bureau. This bureau is under the supervision of the Minis-
ter of Finance, yet it has segregated functions and personnel (though
young MOF officials traditionally serve one rotation as the head of a
local tax bureau, and the agency remains under the strong influence of
the MOF). The MOF has responded with a proposal to strengthen its
own supervisory and enforcement powers, thereby reducing its reliance
on informal notification, which is of questionable effectiveness. Mean-
while, Keidanren and other similar groups have stated their opinions,
favoring either the "separate bureau" approach or an independent
agency framework similar to the system in which the FTC functions.
1 76
The scandals have highlighted weaknesses in the MOF's supervi-
sory and enforcement functions. The immediate problem is not with the
substance of the MOF's regulatory program. The MOF may shift
away from regulation by administrative guidance and move toward
statutory command and Cabinet Order. Thus far, the significant sub-
stantive reforms proposed as a result of the scandals include: (1) legisla-
tion to prohibit loss compensation schemes (enacted in October of
1991); (2) a plan to gradually deregulate brokerage commissions, be-
ginning with commissions paid for large transactions; (3) the establish-
ment, by the MOF, of clear standards for the licensing of new securi-
ties firms, which will end at least some of the industry restrictions
against new entrants; and (4) an MOF proposal to strengthen banking
regulations, first by expanding the scope of restrictions on transactions
with single borrowers, 1 7 and second, by including existing limits on
bank real estate lending, capital ratios, and other guidelines in regula-
tions, as opposed to the current practice of placing such restrictions in
the form of administrative guidance.17 "
An end to fixed commissions would eliminate a source of the se-
curities industry's extraordinary profitability in the 1980s and would
place further pressure on the industry. The plan apparently contains a
flavor of retribution against the securities firms for their failure to obey
175 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 12, 1991, at 1.
176 See id., Sept. 5, 1991, at 5; id., Sept. 3, 1991, at 3.
177 These restrictions would apply to ordinary loans and bill discounts and would
restrict transactions by affiliated nonbank finance companies as well as banks.
178 See id., Oct. 31, 1991, at 7; id., Oct. 6, 1991, at 1; id., Sept. 12, 1991, at 1, 3;
ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1991, at 75; Sterngold, Japanese Study Shift on Brokers, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 12, 1991, at D1, D2.
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MOF guidance. The reforms must also be viewed as a response to in-
tense pressure from the Diet and the media. TheMOF has temporarily
been forced into an adversarial posture in an effort to retain its author-
ity and regain its reputation.
Despite these proposed reforms and sanctions levied against the
big four securities firms, U.S. officials in the U.S.-Japan Financial
Markets Working Group have indicated a deep skepticism that such
measures will resolve the United States' complaints concerning the Jap-
anese financial system. 17' These complaints focus on the underlying
system of regulation by opaque administrative guidance, the slow pace
of interest rate deregulation, the inability to design and introduce new
products, and the lack of access to the Japanese pension fund manage-
ment business.
These occurrences may delay the bank-securities reforms discussed
in this article. Further, the scandals may diminish the MOF's willing-
ness to consider the securities industry's concerns about "fair competi-
tive conditions." Indeed, the banking industry has used the loss-com-
pensation schemes as an argument in favor of bank participation in
secondary markets, and has renewed debate in the FSRC even as the
MOF prepares to draft legislation.180 The scandals may result in the
aggressive intervention of the LDP in the reform debate, as the LDP is
compelled to respond to widespread public concern about the regulation
of financial institutions. According to a recent report, MOF officials
hope to bundle, in a single legislative package, the reforms proposed by
the advisory council reports and measures responding to the recent fi-
nancial scandals.1 "' The MOF hopes to reduce the risk of Diet opposi-
tion to the banking-securities reforms with this political maneuver. The
timely discovery of these scandals may result in stronger reform
legislation.
6. AN ASSESSMENT
6.1. The Stated Goals of the Refbrm
In its 1989 interim report, the FSRC's Second Committee pur-
ported to examine the financial system from the perspective of "users"
1 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Oct. 18, 1991, at 1, 3 (statement by David Mul-
ford, Undersecretary of the Treasury, at the U.S.-Japan Financial Markets Working
Group meetings in Tokyo).
'" See id., Nov. 4, 1991, at 1.
Is JAPAN ECONOMIC INST., JAPAN ECONOMIC INST. REPORT No. 40B 5, 7
(Oct. 25, 1991).
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of financial services, "[ijn the international context" and in view of the
need to ensure "financial order: stability and impartiality.""82 The Sec-
ond Committee set forth many of the stated goals of the reform: promo-
tion of competition, diversification of financial products and services,
growth and vitality of markets, facilitation of entry into Japanese mar-
kets by overseas users and financial institutions, compatibility with fi-
nancial systems in other countries, protection of investors, maintenance
of an orderly credit system, prevention of harmful conflicts of interest,
avoidance of obstacles to effective competition among financial institu-
tions, and promotion of dealings on equal terms among financial insti-
tutions and with corporate clients.1 83
Assuming that the reform is implemented on schedule and that
several rounds of gradual relaxation of restrictions occur, the results of
the reform should include: a significant improvement in the flexibility
of available savings products, better protection for securities investors,
the introduction of new asset finance securities, and some improvement
in the primary market for corporate debt securities. Nevertheless, most
of these benefits will not appear for several years, and those who do not
have a vested interest in the current system recognize that the details of
the reform fall far short of the stated goals.
The advisory council members who did not represent the interests
of financial institutions were frank in their expressions of disappoint-
ment. Professor Royama graded his committee's effort a lackluster
"C. '1u 84 Professor Tachi reportedly used extremely harsh language to
vent his frustration at the STC's approach during the final FIRG
meeting."' 8 Economic commentators, trading company representatives,
and the Asahi Shimbun all expressed disappointment at a process
driven by the interests of the banking and securities industries. The
report fails its basic goals of eliminating the distinctions between first,
long and short-term financial institutions and second, banking and se-
curities activities. 88 One advisory committee member noted that the
"purpose/methodology" section of the final FSRC report and the de-
tails of the reform proposal bear little relation to each other, although a
weak final report was inevitable given the adverse change in the busi-
182 SECOND COMMrrTEE'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
183 Id. at 28-32.
1 See KrNyu ZAISM JIjo, June 17, 1991, at 22 (interview with Shoichi
Royama).
185 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 6, 1991, at 1 (second in a series of ten arti-
cles entitled Ugokidasu Kinyu Seido Kaikaku).
186 See KrNYu ZAISEI Jijo, June 17, 1991, at 44 (interview with Shinichiro
Ohta).
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ness of financial institutions.1 87 Others complained that the debate pro-
ceeded entirely in terms of which financial institutions would win or
lose from the measures.188 Complaints also focused on the extensive use
of the euphemism "fair competitive conditions." '189 The press echoed
these criticisms.190
Financial institution representatives expressed a mixture of pleas-
ure and disappointment in the proposed reforms, which is an appropri-
ate reaction to the compromise.91 These representatives reiterated the
viewpoints of their industries and expressed hope for favorable deci-
sions in the implementation of the proposal."9 2 The one group that re-
mained entirely dissatisfied with the proposed reforms was the long-
term credit banks. Rejection of the multifunctional subsidiary approach,
the limitation on secondary market activities, the exclusion of many
products, and the possibility of rigid firewalls dashed the hopes of the
Industrial Bank of Japan and the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan of
becoming wholesale investment banks. Moreover, the final reports left
open the possibility that ordinary banks would receive powers to raise
long-term funds through the issuance of debentures, which would elim-
inate the special privilege of the long-term credit banks.19 ' Thus, the
long-term credit banks may lose the feature that distinguishes them
from the ordinary banks, thereby making it easier for the MOF to ac-
complish the conversion of long-term credit banks into ordinary banks.
6.2. The Reforms and the Politics of Financial Regulation
The reform proposals will promote at least some of the goals
stated in the 1989 Second Committee report.' These goals may ex-
plain why the MOF presented the Second Committee with five very
different formulas for bank-securities competition in Japan. Further,
these goals undoubtedly influenced the discussion of each alternative
system in the May 26, 1989 interim report of the Second Committee.
However, the stated goals provide little, if any, guidance in determining
why one formula was accepted and the others rejected.
187 See id., at 45 (interview of Hiroko Ohta, Economic Commentator).
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 6, 1991, at 7; Asahi Shimbun, May 26,
1991, at 2.
191 See KINYU ZAsEi Jijo, June 17, 1991, at 40-43 (interviews with bank, trust
bank, securities firm, and long-term credit bank representatives).
192 See id.
IL9 See id., at 41 (interview with Masao Hishimura, Managing Director of the
Industrial Bank of Japan).
1" SECOND COMMITTEE'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-32; see supra notes 182-
183 and accompanying text.
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As an example, the reports praise holding companies, and as the
debate neared its conclusion, there was renewed discussion of the hold-
ing company option as a better formula for reform.195 The holding
company alternative was purportedly rejected because it would violate
the Antimonopoly Law. Despite this contention, it is clear that the re-
form will require statutory amendments in any event, and the
Antimonopoly Law could be amended to permit financial services hold-
ing companies. A more plausible explanation for the selection of the
separated subsidiaries approach exists. Groups that hoped to preserve
existing regulatory protection against other financial institutions (a cat-
egory that includes all financial institutions except the city banks) must
have realized that under a holding company system it would be difficult
to explain distinctions between the powers of, for example, an existing
bank and a new bank subsidiary of the Nomura Securities holding
company or an existing securities firm and a new securities subsidiary
of the Fuji Bank holding company. It is much easier to make credible
arguments for regulatory advantages if financial institutions have dif-
ferent structures. This same political strategy of preserving differentia-
tion explains why the FSRC concluded that, for the present, competi-
tion among the ordinary, long-term credit and trust banks should
proceed through the establishment of subsidiaries. This political strat-
egy also clarifies why the long-term credit banks have not cooperated in
the MOF's attempts to convert them into ordinary banks.
Similarly, the multifunctional subsidiary formula was rejected, not
because of any underlying flaw, but because of opposition from the se-
curities firms through the STC. This opposition, although not stated in
the STC reports, was articulated to the press in terms of an inability to
limit multifunctional subsidiaries to an appropriate wholesale market
or in terms of the necessity of firewalls to protect the stability of bank-
ing operations, even if wholesale customers could be trusted to look out
for themselves. More likely, the securities firms realized that banks'
multifunctional subsidiaries would compete on an equal basis against
the multifunctional subsidiaries of securities firms, as a single type of
new entity. Further, the securities firms must have recognized that after
a period of gradual liberalization, these entities could potentially be-
come universal banks.
The MOF debate over regulatory policy has until now been con-
ducted largely in the form of bargaining among interested parties. The
Second Committee's 1989 report hints at this in its rejection of further
19 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 6, 1991, at 7.
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piecemeal reform,196 and commentators and industry representatives ac-
knowledge the nature of the process. In an interview early in the re-
form process, Professor Tachi suggested that the MOF will never per-
mit free development of products and pricing unless "turf" distinctions
are eliminated. 197 The end of a compartmentalized financial system, as
envisioned by the reformers, was intended, in large part, to facilitate
other reforms in the Japanese financial markets. For example, bank-
securities reform will permit the introduction of asset finance securities
and substantial improvements in the SEL.
For the most part, however, the reform proposals fail to transcend
financial politics and seem instead to be a series of piecemeal accommo-
dations that do not change the basic features of the system. Despite the
hope that the MOF could mediate a grand, final bargain among spe-
cialized financial institutions, many divisions will persist. The vague
final reports evidence an inability to agree upon the details of competi-
tion during the final year of debate. Instead, the reports delegate the
decisions on the remaining details to the MOF.' 98
It is ironic that a reform with the stated goals of reducing turf
battles and increasing the transparency of Japanese financial regulation
will grant the MOF additional discretionary power. A lengthy series of
MOF decisions will be required to implement the reform. This profu-
sion of MOF decisions will serve to increase the number of hard-
fought turf battles, a result that is inconsistent with the stated goals of
the- reform. By agreeing to preserve trust and long-term credit banks
and by limiting activities of new subsidiaries, the MOF ensures contin-
ued bank-bank and bank-securities firm turf fights for years to come.
Although these turf battles frustrate substantive reform, they
should preserve the MOF's power. The MOF can mediate disputes
and can enforce its administrative guidance indirectly through a stream
of decisions concerning the scope of activities, the timing of license ap-
provals, and the extent to which powers should be expanded in a grad-
ual relaxation of restrictions. If reform should ever reach the stage
where financial institutions can freely compete in each other's activities
and can freely design and price products, then the MOF's power will
decline dramatically. A similar decline in power and prestige occurred
to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"). As
Japanese industry matured, the MITI lost its political leverage over
foreign exchange rationing and the steering of scarce investment capital.
Admittedly, the MOF has many other areas of authority, even if its
198 SECOND COMMITrEE'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
'g EKONOMISUTO, May 30, 1989, at 14-16 (interview with Ryuichiro Tachi).
... See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 24, 1991, at 1.
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power over the banking and securities industries should diminish.
However, the MOF should be content with the prospect of a gradual
reform, which is to be implemented over many years.199
7. CONCLUSION
The description of financial regulation in Japan as a political pro-
cess driven by the interests of financial institutions is not novel. It is,
however, a description worth repeating, given the powerful myth of Ja-
pan as a country where bureaucracy guides the shape of economic ac-
tivity, where conflict is avoided, and where government-business con-
sensus wisely steers the development of public policy. The real story in
Japan is one of conflict among powerful private interests, which is ac-
companied by a bureaucracy that mediates these conflicts. The mediat-
ing bureaucracy has only a limited ability or desire to pursue its own
substantive agenda.
This portrait of financial regulation in Japan-as a process in
which powerful private interests often have their way, and the bureau-
cracy attempts to preserve its central position, turning against those pri-
vate interests only when necessary to preserve that position-is not in-
tended as a negative comparison with the state of affairs in the United
States. Over the past decade and with particular intensity in the past
year, the United States has battled with the concept of banking reform
legislation. The ability of private Japanese interests to exact concessions
and to slow efforts of Article 65 reform appear quite familiar to those
who have observed the continuous process of banking reform legislation
in the United States. Given the enormous costs associated with the sav-
ings and loan bailout and the troubled condition of the United States'
banking industry, the United States' banking regulatory framework
cannot serve as a model for Japan or the world.
This article's description of Japanese financial reform suggests
that although institutions differ in Japan and the United States, the
politics of financial regulation involve similar conflicting interests and,
in a general sense, a similar process. This notion contradicts myths
about government-industry relations in Japan. The effective use of this
199 Such gradual reform can be contrasted to the "big bang" approach. The latter
was experienced by England in 1986. See, e.g., Regional Developments: United King-
dom, 21 INT'L LAW. 254, 254-60 (1987)(describing the wholesale deregulation of
London's securities markets, which included the termination of fixed commissions and
the division of stock brokerage functions among specialized entities).
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knowledge can assist United States policymakers in formulating a posi-
tive response to the competitive challenge of Japan's global success in
the financial services industry and beyond.
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